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ALMOST EQUAL: THE METHOD OF ADEQUALITY
FROM DIOPHANTUS TO FERMAT AND BEYOND
MIKHAIL G. KATZ, DAVID M. SCHAPS, AND STEVEN SHNIDER
Abstract. We analyze some of the main approaches in the liter-
ature to the method of ‘adequality’ with which Fermat approached
the problems of the calculus, as well as its source in the piαρισo´της
of Diophantus, and propose a novel reading thereof.
Adequality is a crucial step in Fermat’s method of finding max-
ima, minima, tangents, and solving other problems that a mod-
ern mathematician would solve using infinitesimal calculus. The
method is presented in a series of short articles in Fermat’s col-
lected works [66, p. 133-172]. We show that at least some of the
manifestations of adequality amount to variational techniques ex-
ploiting a small, or infinitesimal, variation e.
Fermat’s treatment of geometric and physical applications sug-
gests that an aspect of approximation is inherent in adequality, as
well as an aspect of smallness on the part of e. We question the rel-
evance to understanding Fermat of 19th century dictionary defini-
tions of piαρισo´της and adaequare, cited by Breger, and take issue
with his interpretation of adequality, including his novel reading
of Diophantus, and his hypothesis concerning alleged tampering
with Fermat’s texts by Carcavy. We argue that Fermat relied on
Bachet’s reading of Diophantus.
Diophantus coined the term piαρισo´της for mathematical pur-
poses and used it to refer to the way in which 1321/711 is ap-
proximately equal to 11/6. Bachet performed a semantic calque in
passing from parisoo¯ to adaequo.
We note the similar role of, respectively, adequality and the
Transcendental Law of Homogeneity in the work of, respectively,
Fermat [19] and Leibniz [39] on the problem of maxima and min-
ima.
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1. The debate over adequality
Adequality, or παρισo´της (parisote¯s) in the original Greek of Dio-
phantus,1 is a crucial step in Fermat’s method of finding maxima, min-
ima, tangents, and solving other problems that a modern mathemati-
cian would solve using infinitesimal calculus. The method is presented
in a series of short articles in Fermat’s collected works [66, pp. 133-172].
The first article, Methodus ad Disquirendam Maximam et Minimam,2
opens with a summary of an algorithm for finding the maximum or
minimum value of an algebraic expression in a variable A. For conve-
nience, we will write such an expression in modern functional notation
as f(a).3
1.1. Summary of Fermat’s algorithm. The algorithm can be bro-
ken up into six steps in the following way:
(1) Introduce an auxiliary symbol e, and form f(a+ e);
(2) Set adequal the two expressions f(a+ e) =AD f(a);
4
(3) Cancel the common terms on the two sides of the adequality.
The remaining terms all contain a factor of e;
(4) Divide by e (see also next step);
(5) In a parenthetical comment, Fermat adds: “or by the highest
common factor of e”;
(6) Among the remaining terms, suppress5 all terms which still con-
tain a factor of e.6 Solving the resulting equation for a yields
the extremum of f .
In modern mathematical language, the algorithm entails expanding
the difference quotient
f(a+ e)− f(a)
e
1adaequalitas or adaequare in Latin. See Section 1.2 for a more detailed etymo-
logical discussion.
2In French translation,Me´thode pour la Recherche du Maximum et du Minimum.
Further quotations will be taken from the French text [19].
3Following the conventions established by Vie`te, Fermat uses capital letters of
vowel, A, E, I, O, U for variables, and capital letters of consonants for constants.
4The notation “=AD” for adequality is ours, not Fermat’s. There is a variety of
differing notations in the literature; see Barner [7] for a summary.
5The use of the term “suppress” in reference to the remaining terms, rather than
“setting them equal to zero”, is crucial; see footnote 36.
6Note that division by e in Step 4 necessarily precedes the suppression of remain-
ing terms that contain e in Step 6. Suppressing all terms containing e, or setting e
equal to zero, at stage 3 would be meaningless; see footnote 22.
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in powers of e and taking the constant term.7 The method (leaving
aside step (5) for the moment) is immediately understandable to a
modern reader as the elementary calculus exercise of finding the ex-
tremum by solving the equation f ′(a) = 0. But the real question is
how Fermat understood this algorithm in his own terms, in the math-
ematical language of his time, prior to the invention of calculus by
Barrow, Leibniz, Newton, et al.
There are two crucial points in trying to understand Fermat’s rea-
soning: first, the meaning of “adequality” in step (2), and second, the
justification for suppressing the terms involving positive powers of e
in step (6). The two issues are closely related because interpretation
of adequality depends on the conditions on e. One condition which
Fermat always assumes is that e is positive. He did not use negative
numbers in his calculations.
Fermat introduces the term adequality in Methodus with a reference
to Diophantus of Alexandria. In the third article of the series, Ad
Eamdem Methodum (Sur la Meˆme Me´thode), he quotes Diophantus’
Greek term παρισo´της, which he translates following Xylander and
Bachet, as adaequatio or adaequalitas [19, p. 126] (see A. Weil [72,
p. 28]).
1.2. Etymology of παρισo´της. The Greek word παρισo´της consists
of the prepositional prefix para and the root isote¯s, “equality”. The
prefix para, like all “regular” prefixes in Greek, also functions as a
preposition indicating position; its basic meaning is that of proxim-
ity, but depending upon the construction in which it appears, it can
indicate location (“beside”), direction (“to”), or source (“from”) (see
Luraghi [46, p. 20-22, 131-145]).
Compounds with all three meanings are found. Most familiar to
mathematicians will be paralle¯los (παρα´λληλoς), used of lines that are
“next to” one another; the Greek for “nearly resembling” is paraple¯sios
(παραπλη´σιoς); but we also find direction in words like paradosis
(παρα´δoσις), “transmitting, handing over” (from para and dosis, “giv-
ing”), and source in words like parale¯psis (παρα´ληψις), “receiving”
(from para and le¯psis, “taking”); there are other meanings for this
prefix that do not concern us.
The combination of para and isos (“equal”) can refer either to a
simple equality (Aristotle, Rhetoric 1410a 23: παρι´σωσις δ’ ’εα`ν ’´ισα
τα` κω˜λα, “It is pariso¯sis if the members of the sentence are equal”) or
an approximate equality (Strabo 11.7.1, ‘´ω ς ϕησι Πατρoκλη˜ς, ‘`oς και`
7Fermat also envisions a division by a higher power of e as in step (5) (see
Section 3).
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πα´ρισoν ‘ηγει˜ται τ o` πε´λαγoς τoυ˜τo τω˜
′
Πoντικω˜
′
“As Patrocles says,
who also considers this sea [the Caspian] to be approximately equal
[parison] to the Black Sea”). We know of no passage other than those
of Diophantus in which a term involving para and isos refers to mathe-
matical equality, whether approximate or otherwise. Diophantus him-
self used the term parisos to describe terms that are approximately
equal, as we shall demonstrate below (Subsection 8.1).
The term isote¯s denotes a relationship (“equality”), not an action
(“setting equal”); the normal term for the action of equalizing would
be a form in -o¯sis, and in fact the words iso¯sis (’´ισωσις) and pariso¯sis
(παρι´σωσις) are attested with the meaning “making equal” or “equal-
ization”; the latter is a common term in rhetoric for using the same (or
nearly the same) number of words or syllables in parallel clauses. The
word παρισo´της, which occurs only in the two Diophantus passages, is
on the face of it more appropriate to the meaning “near equality”.
Fermat himself may not have gotten this far into Greek etymol-
ogy. On the other hand, Fermat viewed Diophantus through the lens
of Bachet’s analysis. Bachet does interpret it as approximate equal-
ity. If Fermat follows Bachet, seeking to interpret Fermat’s method of
adequality/παρισo´της based on the Latin term, adaequare, is missing
the point (see Subsection 7.1).
1.3. Modern interpretations. There are differing interpretations of
Fermat’s method in the literature. A. Weil notes that Diophantus uses
the Greek term
to designate his way of approximating a given number by
a rational solution to a given problem (cf. e.g.Dioph.V.11
and 14) (Weil 1984 [72, p. 28]).
According to Weil’s interpretation, approximation is implicit in the
meaning of the original Greek term.
H. Breger rejects Weil’s interpretation of Diophantus, and proposes
his own interpretation of the mathematics of Diophantus’ παρισo´της.
He argues that παρισo´της means equality to Diophantus (Breger [14,
p. 201]).
Thus, the question of whether there is an element of approximation
in the Greek source of the term is itself subject to dispute. There is also
a purely algebraic aspect to adequality, based on the ideas of Pappus of
Alexandria, and Fermat’s predecessor Vie`te. In Sur la Meˆme Me´thode
following the comment quoted above, Fermat writes as follows:
En cet endroit, Pappus appelle un rapport minimum
µoναχo`ν και` ’ǫλα´χιστoν (singulier et minimum), parce
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que, si l’on propose une question sur les grandeurs donne´es,
et qu’elle soit en ge´ne´ral satisfaite par deux points, pour
les valeurs maximum et minimum, il n’y aura qu’un
point qui satisfasse. C’est pour cela que Pappus appelle
minimum et singulier (c’est-a`-dire unique) le plus petit
rapport de tous ceux qui peuvent eˆtre propose´s dans la
question (Fermat [19, p. 127]).
The point is that the extremum of a quadratic expression at the
point a corresponds to a double root in e for what would be in modern
terms the equation f(a+e)−f(a) = 0. From this point of view, Fermat
explains his method in terms of roots of algebraic equations. In the
first paragraph of the fourth article in the series, Methodus de Maxima
et Minima (Me´thode du Maximum et Minimum), Fermat reveals the
source of this procedure:
En e´tudiant la me´thode de la syncrise et de la anastro-
phe de Vie`te, et en poursuivant soigneusement son ap-
plication a` la recherche de la constitution des e´quations
corre´latives, il m’est venu a` l’esprit d’en de´river un proce´de´
pour trouver le maximum et le minimum et pour re´soudre
ainsi aise´ment toutes les difficulte´s relatives aux condi-
tions limites, qui ont cause´ tant d’embarras aux ge´ome`tres
anciens et modernes (Fermat [19, p. 131]).
From this point of view, adequality is based on replacing the vari-
able a by the variable a + e in the original algebraic expression and
thus creating an equation in a and e which is required to have a double
root at e = 0 for an extremal point a. This interpretation is considered
by Breger [14] and K. Barner [7] to cover all the examples. They deny
that any kind of “approximation” is involved, and hold adequality to
be a formal or algebraic procedure of “setting equal”.
1.4. Wieleitner, Strømholm, and Giusti. The authors H. Wieleit-
ner [74], P. Strømholm [65], and E. Giusti [24] argue that both inter-
pretations, algebraic and approximation, are valid, representing differ-
ent stages in the development of Fermat’s method. The algebraic ap-
proach, following Pappus and Vie`te, involves equating two values f(a)
and f(a + e), below the maximum or above the minimum.8 However,
there is another point of view in which f(a) and f(a + e) are defi-
nitely not assumed by Fermat to be equal, as he writes in Sur la Meˆme
Me´thode that he compares the two expressions “comme s’ils e´taient
8Sometimes the second point is denoted e rather than a+ e, and the two expres-
sions that are equated are f(a) and f(e).
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e´gaux, quoiqu’en fait ils ne le soient point” (Fermat [19, p. 126]), and
a little later “une comparaison feinte ou une ade´galite´” (ibid., p. 127]).
Giusti [24] and Strømholm [65] consider this to represent a second stage
in the development of Fermat’s method. Similarly, in the fourth article,
which begins with a reference to Vie`te and emphasizes the algebraic
approach, Fermat introduces an element of approximation, remarking
that the difference between the two points a and e goes to zero:9
Plus le produit des segments augmentera, plus au con-
traire diminuera la diffe´rence entre a et e, jusqu’a` ce
qu’elle s’e´vanouisse tout a` fait [19, p. 132].
What complicates the task is that Fermat does not separate clearly
between these two methods. They appear in successive paragraphs.
M. Mahoney understands one of the meanings of adequality as “ap-
proximate equality” or “equality in the limiting case” (Mahoney [47,
p. 164, end of footnote 46]), while emphasizing that the term has mul-
tiple meanings.
Fermat never gave a full explanation of his method, but he derived
it from three sources: Diophantus, Pappus, and Fermat’s predecessor
Vie`te (Vieta). If we consider the source in Diophantus and interpret
adequality as approximate equality as did Weil, Strømholm, and Giusti,
it is natural to ask whether Fermat considered e to be arbitrarily small
and eventually negligible, although he never explicitly stated such an
assumption. On the other hand, the algebraic point of view, finding
a condition for a unique root of multiplicity 2, following Pappus and
Vie`te, is clearly the point of view in a number of examples mentioned
above.
These considerations do not resolve the issue of what Fermat thought
about the actual magnitude of e.
Strømholm [65] and Wieleitner [74] deal with this question. They
distinguish two methods in Fermat. One method is algebraic, following
Pappus and Vie`te, which Strømholm calls M2. The other method, M1,
is interpreted as expanding f(a + e)− f(a) in powers of e. The latter
approach is most fully expounded in Fermat’s letter to Bruˆlart [20].
The letter attempts to explain why the method guarantees a maximum
or minimum without assuming a condition on the size of e.
The “approximation” interpretation actually branches out into two
distinct approaches. The difference between them concerns the inter-
pretation of the symbol e that Fermat uses, to form expressions that
in modern notation would be written as “f(x + e) − f(x)”. Namely,
one can think of e as representing a kinetic process such as “tending
9See footnote 8.
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to 0”, as in the fourth article, as cited above, or one can think of e
as “infinitesimal”. G. Cifoletti [17] and J. Stillwell [64] interpret it in
accordance with the latter approach.
1.5. Three approaches to the nature of E. There are therefore
at least three different approaches to Fermat’s symbol E as it appears
in adequalities: algorithmic or formal/algebraic; kinetic E → 0; and
infinitesimal. We will argue that the last one is closest to Fermat’s
thinking.
Finally, we note that two distinct issues are sometimes conflated in
the literature on Fermat’s method. The first issue is whether adequal-
ity means (α) “setting equal”, or whether it is (β) an “approximate
equality”. A second, separate issue concerns the question of what the
famous symbol E stands for: is it (A) an arbitrary variable, or does
it imply (B) some notion of size: small, infinitesimal, tending to zero,
etc.
The trend in the literature is that scholars following the interpreta-
tion (α), also adopt (A), and similarly for the other pair. For instance,
Breger [14, p. 206] rejects the small/infinitesimal idea and supports (A).
But the thrust of his argument is to support the (α)-interpretation
rather than the (A)-interpretation.
These are, in fact, separate issues, as can be seen most readily in the
context of an infinitesimal-enriched ring such as the dual numbers D
of the form a + bǫ where ǫ2 = 0. To differentiate a polynomial p(x),
we apply the following purely algebraic procedure: expand in powers
of ǫ; write p(x+ ǫ) = p(x)+ ǫq(x), where q(x) has no ǫ terms, then one
has p(x+ ǫ)− p(x) = ǫq(x) and q(x) is the derivative.
This produces the derivative of p over D. A similar procedure works
over any other reasonable infinitesimal-enriched extension of R such
as the hyperreals. The algebraic nature of this procedure in no way
contradicts the infinitesimal nature of ǫ.
In addition to arguing that “adequality” is a purely algebraic proce-
dure of “setting equal”, Breger believes that E is a formal variable with
no assumption on size. However, one does not necessarily imply the
other. The procedures in non-standard analysis are purely algebraic
and can be programmed by a finite algorithm (no need for an infinite
limiting process), yet here E is definitely infinitesimal.
No analysis of Fermat’s method can be considered complete that does
not include a discussion of the application to transcendental curves.
Such an analysis appears in Section 5.
Concerning the question as to whether Fermat’s method is a purely
algorithmic/algebraic one, with E being a formal variable, or whether
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it involves some notion of “smallness” on the part of E, we argue that
the answer depends on which stage of Fermat’s method one is dealing
with. He certainly did present an algorithmic outline of his method
in a way that suggests that E is a formal variable. However, when
one examines other applications of the method, one notices additional
aspects of Fermat’s method which cannot be accounted for by means of
a “formal” story. Thus, Fermat exploits his adequality to solve a least
time variational problem for the refraction of light (see Section 9).
Here E corresponds to a variation of a physical quantity, and it would
seem paradoxical to describe it as a formal variable in this context.
Furthermore, in the case of the cycloid, the transcendental nature of
the problem creates a situation that cannot be treated algebraically at
all (see Section 5).
Once it is accepted that at least in some applications, the aspect
of “smallness” on the part of E is indispensable, one can ask in what
sense precisely is E “small”. Today we know of two main approaches
to “smallness”, namely, (1) by means of kinetic ideas related to limits,
or (2) by means of infinitesimals. The former ideas were as yet unde-
veloped in Fermat’s time (though they are already present in Newton
only a few decades later), and in fact one finds very little “tends to. . . ”
material in Fermat. Meanwhile, infinitesimals were already widely used
by Kepler, Wallis, and others. Fermat’s 1657 letter to Digby on Wal-
lis’s method (see Section 2) shows that he was intimately familiar with
the method of indivisibles. What we argue therefore is that it is more
reasonable to assume (2).
The question why Fermat wasn’t more explicit about the nature
of his E is an interesting one. Note that Fermat was involved in an
acrimonious rivalry with Descartes. Descartes thought that one of the
strengths of his own method was that it was purely algebraic. It is
possible that Fermat did not wish to elaborate on the meaning of E
because he wished to avoid criticism by Descartes.
2. Methodological issues in 17th century historiography
On 15 august 1657, Fermat sent a letter to Kenelm Digby (1603–
1665). The letter was entitled “Remarques sur l’arithme´tique des infinis
de S. J. Wallis”. The letter contains a critique of Wallis’s infinitesimal
method that reveals as much about Fermat’s own position as about
Wallis’s method. As we will see, certain aspects of Wallis’s method not
criticized by Fermat are as interesting as the actual criticisms.
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2.1. Fermat’s letter to Digby. The letter is cited by A. Malet [49,
p. 37, footnote 48]. It is also mentioned by J. Stedall, who goes on to
say that
The [mathematical] details of the subsequent argument
need not concern us here (Stedall [61, p. 12]).
We will be precisely interested in the mathematical, as well as the
“metamathematical” issues involved. Fermat summarizes his objection
to Wallis’s method in the following terms:
Mais, de meˆme qu’on ne pourroit pas avoir la raison
de tous les diame`tres pris ensemble des cercles qui com-
posent le coˆne a` ceux du cylindre circonscrit, si on n’avoit
la quadrature du triangle; non plus que la raison des
diame`tres des cercles qui composent le cono¨ıde parabolique
a` ceux qui font le cylindre circonscrit, si on n’avoit la
quadrature de la parabole ; ainsi on ne pourra pas connoˆıtre
la raison des diame`tres de tous les cercles qui composent
la sphe`re a` ceux des cercles qui composent le cylindre
circonscrit, si l’on n’a pas la quadrature du cercle (Fer-
mat [21, p. 348]).
Fermat is making a remarkable claim to the effect that in order to find
the quadrature of the circle, Wallis is exploiting the quadrature of the
circle itself. Fermat appears to be criticizing an alleged circularity in
Wallis’s reasoning.
Apart from the issue of the potency of his critique, what is striking
about it is the aspect of Wallis’s method that Fermat is not criticizing.
Namely, what emerges from Fermat’s presentation is that Fermat is
taking the infinitesimal technique itself for granted. In the paragraph
preceding the one cited above, Fermat talks about spheres and cylin-
ders being composed of infinite families of parallel circles as a routine
matter:
D’ou` il conclut que, puisqu’on a trouve´ aussi la raison de
la sphe`re au cylindre circonscrit, ou celle de l’infinite´ des
cercles paralle`les, dont on peut concevoir que la sphe`re
est compose´e, a` pareille multitude de ceux qui se peu-
vent feindre au cylindre, on pourra aussi espe´rer de pou-
voir de´couvrir la raison des ordonne´es en la sphe`re ou au
cercle a` celles du cylindre ou quarre´, savoir la raison des
diame`tres des cercles infinis qui composent la spheˆre aux
diame`tres des cercles du cylindre. Ce qui seroit avoir la
quadrature du cercle (Fermat [21, p. 347-348]).
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Thus, it is not the infinitesimal method itself that Fermat is criticizing,
but rather the logic of Wallis’s reasoning.
2.2. Huygens and Rolle. C. Huygens [27] declared in 1667 at the
French Academy of Sciences that Fermat’s “e” was an infinitely small
quantity:
Or, en prenant e infiniment petite, la meˆme e´quation
donnera la valeur de EG lorsqu’elle est e´gale a` EF
. . . Ensuite on divise tous les termes par e et on de´truit
ceux qui, apre`s cette division, contiennent encore cette
lettre, puisqu’ils repre´sentent des quantite´s infiniment
petites par rapport a` ceux qui ne renferment plus e
(Huygens [27], cited in Trompler and Noe¨l [68, p. 110]).
Huygens’s interpretation is testimony to the enduring influence of Fer-
mat’s method of adequality already in the 17th century. Yet, Huygens
may have been putting in Fermat’s mouth words that did not emanate
therefrom.10
Similarly, Michel Rolle in 1703 claimed a connection between Fer-
mat’s a and e and Leibniz’s dx and dy:
En 1684, Mr de Leibniz donna dans des journaux de
Leipzig des exemples de la formule ordinaire des tan-
gentes, et il imposa le nom d’e´galite´ diffe´rentielle a` cette
formule [. . . ] Mr de Leibniz n’entreprend point d’expliquer
l’origine de ces formules dans ce projet, ni d’en donner la
de´monstration [. . . ] Au lieu de l’a & de l’e, il prend dx
& dy (Rolle 1703, [58, p. 6]).
Yet Rolle was an enemy of the calculus, and his identification of e
and dx may have been due to his eagerness to denigrate Leibniz. How
are we to avoid this type of pitfall in analyzing Fermat’s oeuvre? In
discussing Fermat’s mathematics, two traps are to be avoided:
(1) Whiggish history, that is, “the study of the past with direct
and perpetual reference to the present” (H. Butterfield 1931
[15, p. 11]). A convincing reading of Fermat must be solidly
grounded in the 17th century and its ideas, rather than 19th or
20th centuries and their ideas.
(2) One needs to consider the possibility that Fermat wasn’t work-
ing with clear concepts that were destined to become those of
the calculus.
We will discuss each of them separately in Subsections 2.3 and 2.4.
10See also Section 10 for Leibniz’s view on Fermat’s method.
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2.3. Whig history. As far as trap (1) is concerned, it was precisely the
risk of tendentious re-writing of mathematical history that prompted
Mancosu to observe that
the literature on infinity is replete with such ‘Whig’ his-
tory. Praise and blame are passed depending on whether
or not an author might have anticipated Cantor and nat-
urally this leads to a completely anachronistic reading of
many of the medieval and later contributions (Mancosu
[50, p. 626]) [emphasis added–the authors].
Thus, Cauchy has been often presented anachronistically as a sort of
proto-Weierstrass. Such a Cauchy–Weierstrass tale has been critically
analyzed by B laszczyk et al. [8], Borovik et al. [10], Br˚ating [13], and
Katz & Katz ([34], [33]). Whiggish tendencies in Leibniz scholarship
were analyzed by Katz & Sherry ([35], [36]).
To guard against this trap, we will eschew potential 19th and 20th
century ramifications of Fermat’s work, and focus entirely on its 17th
century context. More specifically, we will examine a possible connec-
tion between Fermat’s adequality and Leibniz’s Transcendental Law of
Homogeneity (TLH), which play parallel roles in Fermat’s and Leibniz’s
approaches to the problem of maxima and minima. Note the similarity
in titles of their seminal texts: Methodus ad Disquirendam Maximam
et Minimam (Fermat, see Tannery [66, pp. 133]) and Nova methodus
pro maximis et minimis . . . (Leibniz [39]).
Leibniz developed the TLH in order to mediate between assigna-
ble and inassignable quantities. The TLH governs equations involving
differentials. H. Bos interprets it as follows:
A quantity which is infinitely small with respect to an-
other quantity can be neglected if compared with that
quantity. Thus all terms in an equation except those
of the highest order of infinity, or the lowest order of
infinite smallness, can be discarded. For instance,
a+ dx = a (2.1)
dx+ ddy = dx
etc. The resulting equations satisfy this [. . . ] require-
ment of homogeneity (Bos [11, p. 33] paraphrasing Leib-
niz 1710 [43, p. 381-382]).
The title of Leibniz’s 1710 text is Symbolismus memorabilis calculi alge-
braici et infinitesimalis in comparatione potentiarum et differentiarum,
et de lege homogeneorum transcendentali. The inclusion of the tran-
scendental law of homogeneity (lex homogeneorum transcendentalis) in
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the title of the text attests to the importance Leibniz attached to this
law.
The “equality up to an infinitesimal” implied in TLH was explicitly
discussed by Leibniz in a 1695 response to Nieuwentijt, in the following
terms:
Caeterum aequalia esse puto, non tantum quorum dif-
ferencia est omnino nulla, sed et quorum differentia est
incomparabiliter parva; et licet ea Nihil omnino dici non
debeat, non tamen est quantitas comparabilis cum ip-
sis, quorum est differencia (Leibniz 1695 [40, p. 322])
[emphasis added–authors]
Translation:
Besides, I consider to be equal not only those things
whose difference is entirely nothing, but also those whose
difference is incomparably small: and granted that it
[i.e., the difference] should not be called entirely Noth-
ing, nevertheless it is not a quantity comparable to those
whose difference it is.
How did Leibniz use the TLH in developing the calculus? The is-
sue can be illustrated by Leibniz’s justification of the last step in the
following calculation:
d(uv) = (u+ du)(v + dv)− uv = udv + vdu+ du dv
= udv + vdu.
(2.2)
The last step in the calculation (2.2), namely
udv + vdu+ du dv = udv + vdu
is an application of Leibniz’s TLH. In his 1701 text Cum Prodiisset [42,
p. 46-47], Leibniz presents an alternative justification of the product
rule (see Bos [11, p. 58]). Here he divides by dx and argues with differ-
ential quotients rather than differentials. The role played by the TLH
in this calculation is similar to that played by adequality in Fermat’s
work on maxima and minima.
2.4. Clear concepts? Was Fermat working with clear concepts that
were destined to become those of the calculus? This is a complex
question, that in fact conflates two separate issues: (a) were Fermat’s
ideas clear? and (b) were Fermat’s ideas destined to become those of
the calculus? Even the latter formulation is questionable, as the def-
inite article in front of “calculus” disregards that fact, emphasized by
H. Bos [11], that the principles of Leibnizian calculus based on differ-
entials differ from those of modern calculus based on functions. Thus
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the answer to (b) is certainly “we don’t know”, though there is a par-
allelism between adequality and TLH as we argued in Subsection 2.3.
As far as question (a) is concerned, it needs to be pointed out that such
concerns are as old as the critique of Fermat’s method by Descartes,
who precisely thought that Fermat was confused and his method in
the category of a lucky guess.11 However, most modern scholars don’t
share Descartes’ view. Thus, H. Breger wrote:
brilliant mathematicians usually are not so very con-
fused when talking about their own central mathemat-
ical ideas [. . . ] I would like to stress that my hypothe-
sis renders Fermat’s mathematics clear and intelligible,
that the hypothesis is supported by several philological
arguments, and that it does not need the assumption
that Fermat was confused (Breger [14, pp. 193–194]).
For all our disagreements with Breger, this is one point we can agree
upon.
3. Did Fermat make a mistake?
In interpreting Fermat’s adequality, one has to keep in mind that
certain crucial components of the conceptual structure of the calculus
were as yet unknown to Fermat. A striking illustration of this is what
Strømholm refers to as Fermat’s “mistake” (Strømholm [65, p. 51]). Is
it really a mistake, a redundancy, or neither?
In this section, we will write A and E in place of a and e, following
Strømholm. After forming the difference f(A) − f(A + E) and can-
celling out terms not containing E, Fermat writes (in Tannery’s French
translation):
On divisera tous les termes par E, ou par une puissance
de E [19, p. 121].12
Strømholm comments as follows concerning this division:
Fermat told his readers that one was to divide by some
power of E. This, of course, was wrong as can be seen
from
f(A+ E)− f(A) =
∞∑
n=1
En
n!
f (n)(A).
Still, his mistake was understandable (Strømholm [65,
p. 51]).
11See e.g., Mahoney [48, pp. 180–181].
12“We divide all the terms by E, or by some power of E” (the latter clause
corresponds to Step (5) of Fermat’s procedure as outlined in Subsection 1.1).
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Strømholm does not explain how exactly it can be seen from the Tay-
lor series expansion that Fermat was wrong. Strømholm continues as
follows:
As he could not possibly foresee the peculiarities and
future significance of the f (n)(A), he guarded himself
against the possibility that f ′(A) be zero, a case which
might conceivably (to him) turn up in some future prob-
lem” (ibid.).
In the framework of Strømholm’s narrow interpretation of the method,
no such case could conceivably turn up (but see below), and for a
reason unrelated to any “future significance of f (n)(A)”. Namely, if
the derivative vanishes identically (note that Fermat’s calculation is
a symbolic manipulation without assigning a particular value to the
variable A), then the original function itself is identically constant by
the fundamental theorem of calculus (FTC). The latter wasn’t proved
until the 1670s, by Isaac Barrow. Not being aware of the FTC, Fermat
was apparently also unaware of the fact that no such future problem
could turn up, and therefore left in the phrase “some power of E”, even
though only the first power is relevant.
Have we shown then that Fermat’s description of his method contains
a mistake, or at least a redundancy? This is in fact not the case. Giusti
(2009, [24, §6]) notes that in the fifth article Appendice a` la Me´thode
du Maximum et Minimum there is an example involving radicals. In
this case, the method of adequality as applied by Fermat leads to an
expression in which (before division) the least power of E is 2 rather
than 1, and one does have to divide by E2 instead of by E.13
What about the above argument based on the FTC then? What
happened is that Fermat performs a series of algebraic simplifications
so as to eliminate the radicals from the equation, a point also noted
by Andersen [2, p. 59]. The result in this case is an expression where
the least power of E is 2. Such manipulations are not mentioned in
the algorithmic/formal description of the method of adequality, and
were not taken into account in Strømholm’s description of Fermat’s
“mistake”.
This example is a striking illustration of the fact that Fermat’s
method of adequality is not a single method but rather a cluster of
methods. The algorithmic procedure described by Fermat at the outset
is merely a kernel common to all applications, but in each application
13Strømholm’s mistake is repeated by Mahoney in both editions of his book:
“in the problems Fermat worked out, the proviso of repeated division by [E] was
unnecessary” (Mahoney [48, p. 165]).
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the kernel is applied somewhat differently. We will analyze one such
difference in the next two sections.
4. Comparing the first and second problems in Me´thode
In this section, we will analyze some apparent dissimilarities between
Fermat’s approaches to the first two problems in his Me´thode pour la
recherche du maximum et du minimum [19, p. 122–123].
The first problem involves splitting a segment into two subsegments
so as to maximize the area of the rectangle formed by the subsegments
as sides. The solution is a straightforward application of the formal
algorithmic technique he outlined on the previous page [19, p. 121].
Fermat’s second problem involves finding the equation of a tangent
line to a parabola. Mathematically speaking, the second problem is
equivalent to the first. Namely, given a point, say P , on the parabola,
we would write down the point-slope formula for a line through P (with
the point fixed and slope, variable), form the difference between the
point-slope and the formula for the parabola, and look for an extremum
of the resulting expression.
But did Fermat view it that way? He does not appear to have
described it that way. Forming the difference of the two formulas is an
algebraic procedure. Did Fermat have such an algebraic procedure in
mind, or would such an approach go beyond the geometric framework
as it actually appears in Fermat?
What Fermat did write is that the point on the tangent line lies out-
side the parabola. Having stated this geometric fact, Fermat proceeds
to write down an inequality expressing it. Is the resulting inequality an
inessential embellishment of this particular application of the method
of maxima and minima, or is it an essential part of the argument?
At least on the surface of it, Fermat’s formulation is unlike the earlier
case where one obtains an adequality immediately, due to the nature
of the problem, without using an intermediate inequality .
The passage from the inequality to adequality, depending on whether
it is seen as an essential ingredient in the argument, may or may not
make the second example different from the first one, as we discuss in
Subsection 4.1.
4.1. Tangent line and convexity of parabola. Consider Fermat’s
calculation of the tangent line to the parabola, see [19, p. 122-123]. To
simplify Fermat’s notation, we will work with the parabola y = x2, or
x2
y
= 1.
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To understand what Fermat is doing, it is helpful to think of the
parabola as a level curve of the two-variable function x
2
y
.
Given a point (x, y) on the parabola, Fermat wishes to find the tan-
gent line through the point. Fermat exploits the geometric fact that
by convexity, a point
(p, q)
on the tangent line lies outside the parabola. He therefore obtains an
inequality equivalent in our notation to p
2
q
> 1, or p2 > q. Here q =
y − e, and e is Fermat’s magic symbol we wish to understand. Thus,
we obtain
p2
y − e > 1. (4.1)
At this point Fermat proceeds as follows:
(i) he writes down the inequality p
2
y−e
> 1, or p2 > y − e;
(ii) he invites the reader to ade´galer (to “adequate”);
(iii) he writes down the adequality x
2
p2
=AD
y
y−e
;
(iv) he uses an identity involving similar triangles to substitute
x
p
=
y + r
y + r − e
where r is the distance from the vertex of the parabola to the
point of intersection of the tangent to the parabola at y with
the axis of symmetry,
(v) he cross multiplies and cancels identical terms on right and
left, then divides out by e, discards the remaining terms con-
taining e, and obtains the solution y = r.14
What interests us here are the steps (i) and (ii). How does Fermat
pass from an inequality to an adequality? Giusti already noted that
Comme d’habitude, Fermat est autant de´taille´ dans les
exemples qu’il est re´ticent dans les explications. On
ne trouvera donc presque jamais des justifications de sa
re`gle des tangentes (Giusti [24]).
In fact, Fermat provides no explicit explanation for this step. However,
he uses the same principle of applying the defining relation for a curve
to points on the tangent line to the curve. Note that here the quantity e,
as in q = y − e, is positive: Fermat did not have the facility we do of
14In Fermat’s notation y = d, y+r = a. Step (v) can be understood as requiring
the expression y
y−e
− (y+r)2(y+r−e)2 to have a double root at e = 0, leading to the
solution y = r or in Fermat’s notation a = 2r.
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assigning negative values to variables. Thus, Strømholm notes that
Fermat
never considered negative roots, and if A = 0 was a
solution of an equation, he did not mention it as it was
nearly always geometrically uninteresting (Strømholm
[65, p. 49]).
Fermat says nothing about considering points y + e “on the other
side”, i.e. further away from the vertex of the parabola, as he does
in the context of applying a related but different method, for instance
in his two letters to Mersenne (see [65, p. 51]), and in his letter to
Bruˆlart [20].15 Now for positive values of e, Fermat’s inequality (4.1)
would be satisfied by a transverse ray (i.e., secant ray) starting at (x, y)
and lying outside the parabola, just as much as it is satisfied by a
tangent ray starting at (x, y). Fermat’s method therefore presupposes
an additional piece of information, privileging the tangent ray over
transverse rays.
4.2. Two interpretations of the geometric ingredient. What is
the nature of the additional piece of information that would privilege
the tangent ray? There are two possible approaches here:
• one can argue that the additional piece of information is derived
from the geometric context: namely, the tangent line provides
a better approximation than a transverse line, motivating the
passage to an adequality.
• one can argue that both Fermat’s geometric context (tangent
line being outside the parabola) and his inequality (p2 > q) are
merely incidental, and that Fermat’s procedure here is purely
algebraic, namely, equivalent to forming the difference between
the formula for a line through (x, y) and the formula for the
parabola, and seeking an extremum as before.
In support of the geometric interpretation, it could be said that,
in order to understand Fermat’s procedure, other than treating it as
a magician’s rabbit out of a hat, we need to relate to the geometric
context. To passage from inequality to adequality therefore only be-
comes intelligible as something less mysterious, if one assumes that e
is small and exploits the geometric background with a better rate of
approximation provided by the tangent line as compared to a trans-
verse ray. Strømholm [65] similarly emphasizes the role of the smallness
of e in Fermat’s thinking. To assert that Fermat’s procedure using the
15This was noted by Giusti [24].
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symbol e is purely formal/algebraic in the context of this particular
example, is to assert that Fermat is a magician, not a mathematician.
In support of the algebraic interpretation, it could be said that Fer-
mat writes “ade´galons donc, d’apre`s la me´thode pre´ce´dente” with ref-
erence to the second example, apparently implying that the method
of the first and second examples is comparable. Since both methods
contain a common kernel as we discussed in Section 3, the reference to
the previous example is not conclusive.
Treating the geometric ingredient as an essential part of the proof in
this case is the more appealing option, suggesting that the method of
tangents is not a direct application of the kernel of the method of max-
ima and minima, but rather exploits additional geometric information
in a crucial way. Similarly, K. Pedersen comments:
The inequality IO > IP holds for all curves concave
with respect to the axis, and the inequality IO < IP
for convex curves. For curves without points of inflection
it is possible from these inequalities to find a magnitude
depending on a−e and x−e which has an extreme value
for x− e = x (Pedersen16 1980 [54, p. 28]).
She continues:
Neither in his Methodus nor in Fermat’s later writings,
however, is there any indication that this was the way he
related his method of tangents to his method of maxima
and minima (ibid.),
and concludes that
Descartes was right after all in raising the objection that
the method of tangents was not a direct application of
the method of maxima and minima (ibid.).
We saw that the geometric content of the argument dealing with
tangents to parabolas tends to go counter to the formal/algebraic in-
terpretation. Barner [7, p. 34] attempts to save the day by declaring
that Fermat made a mistake. According to Barner, the point we de-
noted (p, q) in Section 4.1 should not be outside the parabola at all,
but rather should be on the parabola. The line passing through (p, q)
should not be the tangent line, but rather a transverse line, whereas e
is the difference in the ordinates of the two points on the parabola.
In this way, the inequality should not be there in the first place, but
should rather be an equality .
16This is the same author as Andersen [2].
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In fact, what Barner describes with uncanny accuracy is the method
of Beaugrand, probably dating from 1638, as analyzed by Strømholm
[65, p. 64-65]. We therefore find Barner’s explanation, as applied to
Fermat, to be forced (see also Subsection 5.3). The formal/algebraic
interpretation of adequality is unconvincing in this particular case.
5. Fermat’s treatment of the cycloid
The cycloid is generated by marking a point on a circle and tracing
the path of the point as the circle rolls along a horizontal straight line.
If the marked point is the initial point of contact of the circle with
the line, and the circle rolls to the right, then the ordinate17 of the
marked point is given by the difference of the length of arc traversed
(the distance the center of the circle has moved) and the distance of
the point from the vertical line through the center of the circle.18
5.1. Fermat’s description. Fermat’s description of the cycloid is based
on a diagram [66, Figure 103, p. 163] reproduced in Figure 1. Let R be
a point on the cycloid and D the point of intersection of the horizontal
line ℓ through R with the axis of symmetry of the cycloid generated
by one full revolution of the circle. If M is the point of intersection
of ℓ with the generating circle when centered on the axis of symmetry,
and C is the apex of that circle then in the words of Fermat:
La proprie´te´ spe´cifique de la courbe est que la droite
RD est e´gale a` la somme de l’arc de cercle CM et de
l’ordonne´e DM19 ([19, p 144]).
Let r be the tangent line to the cycloid at R, and m the tangent
line to the circle at M . To determine the defining relation of r, Fermat
considers the horizontal line NIV OE passing through a point N ∈ r.
Here I is the first point of intersection with the cycloid, while V is the
point of intersection with m, and O is the point of intersection with
the generating circle, and E is the point of intersection with the axis
of symmetry.
The defining relation for r is derived from the defining relation for
the cycloid using adequality. The defining relation for the point I on
the cycloid is
IE = OE + arcCO.
17In this case the ordinate refers to the horizontal coordinate.
18Assuming the circle to have radius 1, the equation of the cycloid as described
above is x = θ − sin θ, y = 1− cos θ.
19To compare Fermat’s description with the parametric description given in the
previous footnote, we note that length of the segment RD is pi − x = pi − θ+ sin θ,
while pi − θ is the length of the arc CM , and the length DM equals sin θ.
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Figure 1. Fermat’s cycloid
By adequality, Fermat first replaces I by the point N ∈ r:
NE =AD OE + arcCO = OE + arcCM − arcMO. (5.1)
Then Fermat replaces O by the point V ∈ m, and the arcMO, by the
length of the segment MV ⊂ m. This produces the linear relation
NE =AD V E + arcCM −MV,
yielding the equation of the tangent line r to the cycloid at R as a graph
over the axis of symmetry. The distanceNE is expressed in terms of the
distance V E, where V ∈ m, and the distance MV along that tangent
line. Thinking in terms of slope relative to the variable distance DE
(which corresponds to the parameter e in the example of the parabola),
Fermat’s equation says that the slope of r relative to DE is the slope
of m minus the proportionality factor of MV relative to DE.20 To
summarize, Fermat exploited two adequations in his calculation:
(1) the length of a segment along m adequals the length of a seg-
ment of a circular arc, and
20The slope of the tangent line relative to the axis of symmetry, or equivalently,
relative to the y axis, given by elementary calculus is d(pi−x)
dθ
/ dy
dθ
= −1sin θ +
cos θ
sin θ . The
length MV equals e/(sin θ) and the slope of the tangent line to the circle relative
to the y axis is cos θsin θ , in agreement with Fermat’s equation.
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(2) the distance from the axis of symmetry to a point on r (or m)
adequals the distance from the axis to a corresponding point on
the cycloid (or circle).
As Fermat explains,
Il faut donc ade´galer (a` cause de la propre´te´ spe´cifique
de la courbe qui est a` conside´rer sur la tangente) cette
droite za−ze
a
[i.e., NE] a` la somme OE + arcCO . . . [et]
d’apre`s la remarque pre´ce´dente, substituer, a` OE, l’or-
donne´e EV de la tangente, et a` l’arc MO, la portion
de la tangente MV qui lui est adjacente (Fermat [19,
p. 144]; [66, p. 228]).
The procedure can be summarized in modern terms by the following
principle.
Principle 5.1. The tangent line to the curve is defined by using ade-
quality to linearize the defining relation of the curve, or “ ade´galer (a`
cause de la propre´te´ spe´cifique de la courbe qui est a` conside´rer sur la
tangente).”
Fermat uses the same argument in his calculation of the tangents
to other transcendental curves whose defining property is similar to
the cycloids and involves arc length along a generating curve. For a
discussion of some of these examples, see Giusti [24] and Itard [28].
5.2. Breger’s interpretation. Breger claims that Fermat
does not make use of an approximate equality between
arc length of the circle and a segment of the tangent.
The latter interpretation usually is made, but it plainly
contradicts the text: Fermat explicitly calls the straight
lineDE “recta utcumque assumpta” (Fermat 1891, 163)
[droite arbitraire], that is, DE is not infinitely small or
“very small” [14, p. 206].
Is it convincing to argue, as Breger does, that the hypothesis of small-
ness plays no role here? It is certainly true that the axis of symmetry
contains points arbitrarily far from the fixed point D. However, being
able meaningfully to apply the defining relation for the curve to the
tangent line, is contingent upon the fact that for points near the point
of tangency the tangent line gives a good (second order) approximation
to the curve.
Why does Fermat’s calculation give the tangent to the cycloid? In
modern terms, this is because of the quadratic order in e for the error
term which results from making each of the following two substitutions:
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(1) substituting the point N on the tangent line for the point I on the
cycloid and (2) substituting the length of a segment of the tangent to
the circle for arc CO on the circle.
Breger’s analysis of the example proceeds as follows:
Fermat (1891, 163 last paragraph) looks at the expres-
sion NE−OE−CM+MO (CM andMO being arcs of
the circle)[eq. (5.1)]. This expression takes a minimum,
namely zero, if the point E coincides with the point D.
Then Fermat replaces MO−OE by MU −UE [U = V
above]. Now if the point E is not too far away of [sic]
the point D, then
MO − OE ≥ −MD
as well as
MU − UE ≥ −MD
and equality holds if and only if the points E and D co-
incide. ThereforeNE−UE−CM+MU has a minimum,
namely zero, if the points E and D coincide (Breger [14,
p. 206]).21
Note that Breger suppresses the term e = DE by setting it equal to
zero (in discussing the expression NE −UE −CM +MU) at stage 3,
namely prior to division by e,22 and with this concludes his argument
in favor of a “minimum” interpretation. Such a procedure is however
meaningless and certainly cannot be attributed to Fermat. Fermat
clearly states:
Divisons par e; comme il ne reste ici aucun terme super-
flu, il n’y a pas d’autre suppression a` faire (Fermat [19,
p. 145]).
Fermat thus asserts that there are no terms to be suppressed after divi-
sion by e in the example of the cycloid. Breger’s erroneous suppression
of DE prior to division by e is not accidental, but rather stems from a
desire to force a “minimum” interpretation on Fermat.
Breger concludes his discussion of the cycloid by pointing out that
It is hard for the modern reader to get rid of the limit
ideas in his mind, and so he considers the replacement of
a very small arc length of the circle by a very small seg-
ment of the tangent to be quite natural. But this is not
21The segment MD in Breger’s text does not appear in either expression NE −
OE − CM +MO or NE − UE − CM +MU and is clearly a misprint for MC.
22See footnote 6.
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the way of Fermat (Breger 1994 [14, p. 206]) [emphasis
added–the authors].
Granted, modern “limit ideas” as applied to Fermat are a tell-tale sign
of Whiggish history discussed in Section 2. However, setting e equal to
zero prior to division by e is hardly “the way of Fermat”, either.
To conclude, Fermat’s treatment of the cycloid and other transcen-
dental curves cannot be accounted for by means of a formal/algebraic
reading, and requires an element of approximation for a convincing
interpretation.
5.3. Who erred: Fermat or Barner? In a recent article, K. Barner
(2011, [7]) expresses agreement with Breger, while noting an addi-
tional fine point. He claims that, while aequare and adaequare are
semantically equivalent, Fermat uses the term adaequare when defin-
ing a dependence relation between two variables. Thus, the adequation
f(x+ h) =AD f(x) defines the dependence of x on h. Barner goes on
to interpret Fermat’s method in terms of (Dini’s) implicit function the-
orem.
On page 23, Barner writes: “Und genau dies ist die Bedeutung des
Wortes adæquare: es bezeichnet die Gleichheit zwischen zwei Termen,
die keine Identita¨t sondern eine von der Identita¨t verschiedene Relation
definiert” [And this is exactly the meaning of the word adaequare: it
indicates the equality between two terms, an equality which defines not
an identity, but rather a relationship distinct from identity].
Barner further claims that there is not really one uniform method,
and to assume that Fermat has a clearly formulated method is an
anachronism: “Zu unterstellen, da dies fu¨r Fermat ebenfalls eine selb-
stversta¨ndliche Routine gewesen sei, das ist ein Anachronismus” [To
assume that for Fermat this [method] was a self-evident/obvious pro-
cedure is an anachronism].
On page 27, Barner goes on to claim that Fermat had to use a bit
of ‘trickery’ because his method is not completely correct: “Ich mo¨chte
einfach nur verstehen, warum Fermat mit seiner Trickserei Erfolg hat,
obwohl der Ansatz, den er dabei macht, die Idee seiner ‘Methode’ nicht
ganz korrekt wiedergibt” [I would simply like to understand why Fer-
mat was successful with his little trickery, even though the assumption
that he makes does not represent the basic idea of his ‘method’ with
full accuracy].
Barner’s approach ultimately leads him astray when dealing with
tangents. Barner seeks to replace the tangent line by a secant line
(page 34), since his interpretation forces him to assume that the sec-
ond point near the point of tangency is on the parabola itself (point P
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in his diagram on page 34) rather than on the tangent line (point O in
his diagram), so as to get an exact equality: “Aber der Punkt P (und
damit bei Fermat auch O!) liegt damit auf der Kurve und erlaubt es
ihm, suivant la proprie´te´ spe´cifique de la ligne courbe, die algebrais-
chen Eigenschaften der vorgelegten Kurve auch fu¨r den Punkt O in
Anspruch zu nehmen” [But the point P–and thus, according to Fer-
mat, the point O as well–lies thereby on the curve and allows him,
suivant la proprie´te´ spe´cifique de la ligne courbe, to claim the algebraic
properties of the curve under consideration for the point O as well].
How plausible is Barner’s claim? Barner’s claim contradicts Fermat’s
explicit statement, which Barner had just quoted:
Apre`s avoir donne´ le nom, tant a` notre paralle`le qu’a`
tous les autres termes de la question, tout le meˆme qu’en
la parabole, je conside`re derechef cette paralle`le, comme
si le point qu’elle a dans la tangente e´toit en effet en la
ligne courbe, et suivant la propriete´ spe´cifique de la ligne
courbe, je compare cette paralle`le par ade´galite´ avec
l’autre paralle`le tire´e du point donne´ a` l’axe ou diame`tre
de la ligne courbe. Cette comparaison par ade´galite´ pro-
duit deux termes ine´gaux qui enfin produisent l’e´galite´
(selon ma me`thode), qui nous donne la solution de la
question (Fermat quoted in Barner [7, pp. 35-36]).
Thus, Barner has pursued his interpretation to the point of contra-
dicting Fermat’s own comments. Fermat writes explicitly that he is
applying the defining property of the curve to points on the tangent
line. He says it again in his discussion of the cycloid as we have shown
(see Subsection 5.2).
On page 36, Barner goes on to say that he can’t understand why Fer-
mat kept making the same mistake: “Warum hat Fermat sein wider-
spru¨chliches Vorgehen bei allen seinen Beispielen zur Tangentenmeth-
ode immer wieder erneut verwendet? Warum hat er die Sekante, mit
der er de facto operiert, nie erwa¨hnt? Ich weiß es nicht” [Why did Fer-
mat continually repeat his inconsistent procedure for all his examples
for the method of tangents? Why did he never mention the secant,
with which he in fact operated? I do not know].
Barner’s dilemma does not arise in our interpretation, which avoids
attributing errors to Fermat.
6. Bachet’s semantic calque
The choice of the Latin verb adaequo in Bachet’s translation of Dio-
phantus is explained in Bachet’s notes as follows:
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Since in questions of this kind, Diophantus nearly23 equ-
ates the sides of the squares24 that are being sought, to
some side, but he does not properly equate them, he
calls this comparison παρισo´της and not ’ισo´της. We
too call it not equality but adequality, just as we also
translate πα´ρισoν as adequal.25
Here Bachet clearly differentiates the meanings of aequo and adae-
quo: the former is “equal”, the latter “nearly equal”.26 Notice that
what Bachet performs here is a semantic calque: the Greek para and
isoo¯ are individually translated to ad and aequo, and recombined to
produce adaequo. Bachet does not have the Latin meaning of adaequo
in mind, but rather a new meaning derived from his understanding of
the term coined by Diophantus.
7. Breger on mysteries of adaequare
In 1994, Breger sought to challenge what he called the “common
dogma” to the effect that
Fermat uses “adaequare” in the sense of “to be approxi-
mately equal” or “to be pseudo-equal” or “to be counter-
factually equal” [14, p. 194] [emphasis in the original–the
authors].
After some introductory remarks related to the dating and editing
of various manuscripts, he continues
Having made these introductory remarks I want to put
forward my hypothesis: Fermat used the word “adae-
quare” in the sense of “to put equal” [14, p. 197] [italics
in the original].
In this section, we compare Breger’s interpretation and that of the
viewpoint of Strømholm and Giusti that there are (at least) two differ-
ent approaches in Fermat. One is based on the insight from Pappus,
and involves a symmetric relation between two equal values near an
extremum. The other is based on the insight from Diophantus and the
method of παρισo´της, which exploits an approximation. In the first
23proxime in the Latin.
24Mathematically speaking, it would apparently have been more correct to write
“squares of the sides”.
25“Quia enim in huiusmodi quaestionibus Diophantus, cuidam lateri adaequat
proxime latera quadratorum quaesitorum, non autem aequat proprie, vocat ille hanc
comparitionem piαρισo´τητα non autem ’ισo´τητα. Nos etiam non aequalitatem sed
adaequalitatem appellamus, sicut etiam piα´ρισoν vertimus adaequale.”
26See a related discussion in Itard (1974, [29, p. 338]).
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approach, “adequality” has an operational meaning of “setting equal”
as Breger contends. However, in the second approach (see Section 5),
as well as in the application of the method to tangents (see Section 4),
the element of approximation is essential.
7.1. The philology of παρισo´της. Breger presents several arguments
in defense of his hypothesis. The first two arguments are based on
dictionary definitions, first of the Latin adaequare and second of the
original Greek term παρισo´της. Both of these arguments are flawed.
Breger questions why Fermat would choose to employ the term adae-
quare in a sense different from that given in standard Latin dictionaries:
There are well established Latin words to indicate an
approximate equality, namely “approximare” or, more
frequently used in classical Latin as well as in the 17th
century, “appropinquare”. It is well known that Fer-
mat’s knowledge of Latin and Greek was excellent, and
so if he wanted to tell us that there was an approximate
equality, why should he use a word indicating an equal-
ity? As far as I know, this question has not been an-
swered nor even discussed by any adherent of the dogma
of Fermat interpretation (Breger [14, p. 198]).
The first point is that there was no pre-existing word meaning “to set
two things approximately equal”. Non-mathematical texts do not talk
that way; when Polybius says, for example, that Rome and Carthage
were πα´ρισα in their power (Polyb. 1.13.8), nobody takes him to
be stating a mathematical equivalence. And the words that Breger
suggests, approximare or appropinquare, do not mean what Fermat
wants to do: he does not want to “approximate” f(a), but rather
to compare two expressions, f(a) and f(a + e). If what he wanted
to do was to treat them as being approximately equal, neither the
Romans nor the mathematicians of Fermat’s time had a term available
for that; and since the Latin prefix ad- commonly translated the Greek
prefix par(a)-, the term adaequalitas would be the obvious equivalent
for παρισo´της.
To give an example of a Greek par transformed into a Latin ad,
note that the rhetorical figure that the Greeks called paronomasia
(παρoνoµασι´α), whereby a speaker makes a pun on two similar but
not identical words, was called in Latin adnominatio. But as far as Fer-
mat is concerned, the obvious reason that he used adaequalitas is that
that was the term that Bachet used to translate the Greek παρισo´της.
Morever, Fermat himself explicitly refers to the Greek term.
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The fact that Breger is aware of this problem is evident when he
writes:
Therefore Xylander and Bachet were right in using the
word “adaequalitas” in their translations of Diophantus
[. . . ] although that does not imply that they had un-
derstood the mathematics of the passage (Breger [14,
p. 200]).
To argue his hypothesis, Breger is led to postulate that Xylander and
Bachet misunderstood Diophantus! Breger appears to acknowledge
implicitly that Bachet’s intention was to engineer a semantic calque
(see Section 6), but argues that Bachet’s calque was a vain exercise, to
the extent that adaequo already has the meaning of parisoo¯, albeit not
the meaning Bachet had in mind.
7.2. Greek dictionary. Breger’s “argument [that] is just based on the
Greek dictionary” [14, p. 199] is misconceived. The Parisian Thesaurus
Graecae Linguae of 1831-75 [63]27 on which Breger bases himself, was
a reissue of Henricus Stephanus’ dictionary of the same name [62].
The latter, a work of stupendous scholarship, was published in 1572,
three years before Xylander’s original edition of Diophantus. Neither
Stephanus’ Thesaurus, nor the cheaper and hence much more widely
available pirated abridgement of it by Johannes Scapula [59] (origi-
nally printed in 1580 and reprinted innumerable times afterward), nor
Stephanus’ 1582 reissue, included the word παρισo´της, though both
Stephanus and Scapula did have πα´ρισoς, aequalis, uel compar : “equal
or similar” (with the note that the writers on rhetoric used the expres-
sion to mean prope aequatum, “made nearly equal”) and other words
formed from παρα´ and ’´ισoς.
In the nineteenth-century Paris reissue, the term παρισo´της was
added by Karl Wilhelm Dinsdorf, one of the editors, who cited Dio-
phantus and translated “Æqualitas.” The Paris Stephanus, however,
is not today “the best Greek dictionary”, contrary to Breger’s claim.
The most (and in fact, for the time being, the only) authoritative dic-
tionary today is Liddell-Scott-Jones [44], which defines παρισo´της as
“approximation to a limit, Dioph. 5.17.” But in fact all Greek and
Latin dictionaries (with the exception of the original Stephanus, which
was chiefly the result of Stephanus’ own scholarship and that of Guil-
laume Bude´) are secondary sources, recording the meanings that others
have given to the words; so both Dindorf and Liddell-Scott-Jones were
simply recording the translations then current for Diophantus’ use of
27Breger gives the dates 1842-7, understating the magnitude of the task.
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παρισo´της. Both “equality” and “near equality” are possible meanings
for παρισo´της; and it is up to the editors and critics of Diophantus to
tell the lexicographers which meaning he intended, not the other way
around.
Fermat is very unlikely to have used either the hugely expensive
and rare Stephanus or the easily available Scapula, when Bachet had
printed Diophantus with a facing Latin translation; and his care in
saying that he is using the term adaequentur ut loquitur Diophantus,
“as Diophantus says”, seems to make it clear that he is specifically not
using the Latin term in its usual meaning of “be set equal”, but, rather,
in a meaning peculiar to Diophantus. That meaning, as we argue in
Section 8, can only be “be set approximately equal”, as it was correctly
understood by Bachet.
8. The mathematics of παρισo´της
In this section we will analyze the problems in which Diophantus
introduces the term παρισo´της.
8.1. The παρισo´της of Diophantus. The relevant problems are in
Book Five, problems 12, 14, and 17 in Bachet’s Latin translation.28
Problem 14 uses the term πα´ρισoς (see [5]).
The term πα´ρισoς occurs on page 310 of Bachet’s Latin translation
Diophanti Alexandrini, Arithmeticorum Liber V. Here the left column
is the Greek original, while the right column is the Latin translation.
The term πα´ρισoς is the first word on line 8 in the left column. In the
right column, line 13, we find its Latin translation adaequalem.
8.2. Lines 5-8 in Diophantus. In more detail, lines 5-8 in the Greek
original contain the following phrase containing πα´ρισoς:
δει˜ o
,˜
υν τ o`ν ι¯. διελει˜ν ǫ
,
ι ς τρει˜ς τετραγω´νoυς ‘´oπως
‘εκα´στoυ τετραγω´νoυ ‘η πλευρα` πα´ρισoς η˜
‘
µ¯′ ι¯α
¯
.29
Latin translation as printed:30
Oportet igitur diuidere 10. in tres quadratos, vt vniu cuiu que
quadrati latus it adæquale vnitatibus 11
6
.
Latin translation in modern letters:
28The numbering is the same in Wertheim’s German translation. However, in
Ver Eecke’s French translation, the corresponding problems are 9, 11, and 14, which
is the numbering referred to by Weil.
29The letter appearing in the exponent under the bar is the letter stigma (a
ligature of σ and τ).
30Here all three occurrences of the symbol are long “s”s.
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Oportet igitur dividere 10 in tres quadratos, ut unius-
cuiusque quadrati latus sit adaequale unitatibus 11
6
.
English translation:
So we have to divide ten into three squares, so that the
side of each square is adequal to 11
6
units.
8.3. Lines 14-16 in Diophantus. Lines 14-16 in the Greek original
contain the following phrase containing πα´ρισoς:
δει˜ o
,˜
υν τ o`ν ‘εκα´στη τω˜ν πλευρω˜ν τoυ´των παρασκευα´σαι πα´ρισoν
ι¯α
¯
.31
Latin translation as printed:
Oportet igitur horum cuiu uis lateri adæqualem facere 11
6
.
Latin translation in modern letters:
Oportet igitur horum cuiusvis lateri adaequalem facere 11
6
.
English translation:
So the side of each of these we have to make adequal
to 11
6
.
8.4. Lines 20-21 in Diophantus. Lines 20-21 in the original Greek:
δǫι˜ o
,˜
υν ‘εκα´στην πλευρα`ν κατασκευα´σαι νε.
Latin as printed:
Oportet itaque vnumquodque latus adæquare ip i 55.
Latin in modern letters:
Oportet itaque unumquodque latus adaequare ipsi 55.
English:
So each side we have to make adequal to 55.
8.5. Line 25 in Diophantus. Line 25: Greek:
ταυ˜τα ’´ισα µoνα´σι ι.
Latin as printed:
hæc æquantur 10.
Latin in modern letters:
haec aequantur 10.
English:
These equal 10 units.
31See footnote 29.
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8.6. πα´ρισoς as approximate equality. Diophantus wishes to repre-
sent the number 10 as a sum of three squares. The solution he eventu-
ally finds is denoted (α, β, γ) by Ver Eecke [69, p. 205]. In this notation,
Diophantus seeks α, β, γ each of which is as close as possible (πα´ρισoς)
to the fraction 11
6
. The solution eventually found is α = 1321
711
, β = 1288
711
,
γ = 1285
711
.
Thus, Diophantus specifically uses the term πα´ρισoς to describe the
way in which the numbers 1321
711
, 1288
711
, and 1285
711
approximate the frac-
tion 11
6
. Interpreting Diophantus’ παρισo´της as anything other than
“approximate equality” is therefore purely whimsical. In the next sub-
section we describe the method of Diophantus in more detail.
8.7. The method of Diophantus. The following description of the
method which Diophantus called παρισo´της is based on the notes of
Ver Eecke [69], Wertheim [73], and the paper of Bachmakova [6]. Dio-
phantus does not have a theory of equations, but gives an algorithm
for solving a class of problems by solving a particular example. We will
explain his method in terms of equations for the reader’s convenience.
In all three examples involving παρισo´της, the problem is to express
a certain number as the sum of two or three rational squares, with a
further inequality constraining the individual values.
In problem 12, one seeks two rational squares whose sum is 13 and
each one is greater than 6.
In problem 14, one seeks three rational squares whose sum is 10 and
such that each one is greater than 3.
In problem 17, one seeks two rational squares whose sum is 17 and
such that each one is less than 10.
In all three cases, the first step is to find a rational square approx-
imately equal to either one half or one third of the desired sum, de-
pending on whether two or three numbers are sought. In addition,
Diophantus uses the existence of a preliminary partial solution involv-
ing two or three rational squares giving the desired sum, N , but failing
to satisfy the required inequalities. Call these numbers ai and denote
the rational square close to one half or one third of the desired sum
by b. He then expresses b as a sum b = ai+ci, and considers an equation
of the form
Σ(ai + tci)
2 = N = Σa2i .
Canceling equal terms on the two sides and dividing by t gives a linear
equation for t with a rational solution t0. Since t = 1 is nearly a
solution, the exact solution t0 is close to 1 and defines the numbers ai+
t0ci satisfying the required inequality.
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As mentioned in Subsection 8.1, Diophantus’ πα´ρισoς refers to the
approximate equality of each of the ai + t0ci to the original fraction b.
Ver Eecke explains the matter as follows in a footnote:
παρισo´τητoς32 α
,
γωγη˜, c’est-a`-dire “la voie de la quasi-
e´galite´” ou d’approximation vers une limite; me´thode
dont l’objet est de re´soudre des proble`mes tels que celui
de trouver 2 ou 3 nombres carre´s, dont la somme est
un nombre donne´, et qui sont respectivement au plus
rapproche´s d’un meˆme nombre (Ver Eecke [69, p. 203,
footnote 2]).
The method, as explained here, is remarkably similar to Fermat’s. It
starts with a near equality and defines a quadratic equation which is
solved as an exact equality. The method of παρισo´της might be called
“the method of nearby values” (see Subsection 1.2). G. Lachaud [38,
Section 5] similarly speaks of παρισo´της as involving approximation.
8.8. Breger on Diophantus. Breger acknowledges that
At the first step - and this is the relevant step charac-
terizing the method of παρισo´της - he finds a positive
rational z with the property 2z2 ≈ 2a+ 1 [14, p. 200].
After discussing the Diophantine problems, Breger claims that
the approximate equality which in fact occurs in Dio-
phantus’s Arithmetic is only due to the fact that Dio-
phantus seeks rational solutions [14, p. 202].
Breger’s claim that Diophantus is seeking an approximate rational solu-
tion is in error. In fact, Diophantus starts from an approximate rational
solution, to derive an equation for an exact rational solution. The is-
sue of approximation is not related to the distinction rational/irrational
since irrational solutions were outside the scope of Diophantus’s con-
ceptual framework. Breger further remarks that
[i]t is strongly misleading to mix Fermat’s notation with
our own and to describe his method in these cases by
something like “f(A) adaequatur f(A−E)”, as is often
done [14, p. 204].
How is one to interpret Breger’s comment? The fact is that setting the
former expression adequal to the latter is precisely what Fermat does
in the very first example, using a+ e rather than a− e. In the French
translation which uses modern notation (in place of Fermat’s original
32The spelling of piαρισo´της changed because of declension. It appears here in
the genitive case.
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notation a` la Vie`te for the mathematical expressions), the phrase ap-
pears in the following form:
Soit maintenant a+e le premier segment de b, le second
sera b− a− e, et le produit des segments:
ba− a2 + be− 2ae− e2;
Il doit eˆtre ade´gale´ au pre´ce´dent: ba − a2 (Fermat [19,
p. 122]).
In the original Latin version, the last two lines above read as follows:
B inA−Aq. +B inE −A inE bis− Eq.,
quod debet adaequari superiori rectangulo
B inA− Aq.
(see Fermat [66, p. 134]). Breger continues, “The method consists in
finding a polynomial in E which takes a minimum if E = 0” [14, p. 204].
However, Fermat does not merely apply his method to polynomials. He
ultimately applied the method in far greater generality:
At first Fermat applies the method only to polynomials,
in which case it is of course purely algebraic; later he
extends it to increasingly general problems, including
the cycloid (Weil [71, p .1146]).
In Section 5 we argued that transcendental curves such as the cycloid
necessarily require an element of approximation.
8.9. The Diophantus–Fermat connection. The mathematical ar-
eas Diophantus and Fermat were working in were completely different.
It was arithmetic and number theory in the case of Diophantus, and
geometry and calculus in the case of Fermat. Such a situation creates a
fundamental problem: if one rejects the “approximation” thread con-
necting Diophantus to Fermat, why exactly did Fermat bring Diophan-
tus and his terminology into the picture when working on problems of
maxima and minima?
Breger’s solution to the problem is to declare that Diophantus was
talking about minima and Fermat was also talking about minima.
What kind of minima was Diophantus talking about? Breger’s an-
swer is that Diophantus’ minimum is. . . 0. Namely, |x2− y2| is always
bigger than zero, but gets arbitrarily close to it:
The minimum evidently is achieved by putting x equal
to y, and that is why the method received its name
“method of παρισo´της or putting equal”. As there is
a minimum idea in the Diophantus passage, Fermat’s
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reference to Diophantus becomes intelligible (Breger [14,
p. 201]).
Does Fermat’s reference to Diophantus become intelligible by means
of the observation that |x2 − y2| gets arbitrarily close to 0? According
to Breger’s hypothesis, Diophantus was apparently led to introduce a
new term, παρισo´της, to convey the fact that every positive number
is greater than zero. To elaborate on Breger’s hypothesis, zero is the
infimum of all positive numbers, which is presumably close enough to
the idea of a minimum. All this is supposed to explain the connection
to Fermat’s method of minima.
There are at least two problems with such a reading of Diophantus.
First, did Diophantus have the number zero? Second, the condition
that Diophantus imposes is merely the bound
|x2 − y2| < 1, (8.1)
rather than any stronger condition requiring the expression |x2−y2| to
be arbitrarily close to zero. Thus, Diophantus was not concerned with
the infimum of |x2−y2|. If one drops the approximation issue following
Breger, the entire Diophantus–Fermat connection collapses.
9. Refraction, adequality, and Snell’s law
In addition to purely mathematical applications, Fermat applied his
adequality in the context of the study of refraction of light, so as to
obtain Snell’s law. Thus, in his Analyse pour les re´fractions , Fermat
sets up the formulas for the length of two segments
CO.m =
√
m2n2 +m2e2 − 2m2be, IO.b =
√
b2n2 + b2e2 + 2b2ae,
representing the two parts of the trajectory of light across a boundary
between two regions of different density, and then writes:
La somme de ces deux radicaux doit eˆtre ade´gale´e, d’apre`s
les re`gles de l’art, a la somme mn + bn (Fermat [19,
p. 150]) [emphasis added–the authors]
Fermat explains the physical underpinnings of this application of
adequality in his Synthe`se pour les re´fractions , where he writes that
light travels slower in a denser medium (Fermat [19, p. 151]). Fermat
states the physical principle underpinning his mathematical technique
in the following terms:
Notre de´monstration s’appuie sur ce seul postulat que la
nature ope`re par les moyens et les voies les plus faciles
et les plus aise´es [19, p. 152],
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and goes on to emphasize that this is contrary to the traditional as-
sumption that “la nature ope`re toujours par les lignes les plus courtes”.
Rather, the path chosen is the one traversed “dans le temps le plus
court” (ibid.). This is Fermat’s principle of least time in optics. Its im-
plicit use by Fermat in his Analyse pour les re´fractions in conjunction
with adequality, is significant.
Namely, this physical application of adequality goes against the grain
of the formal/algebraic approach. The latter focuses on the higher mul-
tiplicity of the root of the polynomial f(a+e)−f(a) at an extremum a,
where the extremum can be determined by an algebraic procedure with-
out ever assigning any specific value to e, and obviating the need to
speak of the nature of e. In this method, denoted M2 by Strømholm,
the symbol e could be a formal variable, neither small or large, in fact
without any relation to a specific number system.
However, when we apply a mathematical method in physics, as in
the case of the refraction principle provided by Snell’s law, mathemat-
ical idealisations of physical magnitudes are necessarily numbers. The
principle is that the light chooses a trajectory τ0 which minimizes travel
time from point A to point B. To study the principle mathematically
is to commit oneself to comparing such a trajectory to other trajec-
tories τs in a family parametrized by a numerical parameter s. Here
we need not assume an identity of the line in physical space with a
number line (the hypothesis of such an identification is called Cantor’s
axiom in the literature); rather, we merely point out that a number
line is invariably what is used in mathematical idealisations of physical
processes.
In studying such a physical phenomenon, even before discussing the
size of e (small, infinitesimal, or otherwise), one necessarily commits
oneself to a number system rather than treating e as a formal vari-
able. Fermat’s application of adequality to derive Snell’s law provides
evidence against a strict formal/algebraic interpretation of adequality.
Applications to physical problems necessarily involve a mathematical
implementation based on numbers. Classical physics was done with
numbers, not algebraic manipulations. One can’t model phenomena in
classical physics by means of formal variables.
Certainly when a physicist performs mathematical operations, he
does exactly the same thing as a mathematician does. However, mod-
eling physical phenomena by using mathematical idealisation, is a stage
that precedes mathematical manipulation itself. In such modeling,
physical phenomena get numerical counterparts, and therefore neces-
sarily refer to a number system rather than formal variables.
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Pedersen & Pedersen interpret Fermat’s deduction of the sine law of
refraction
as an early example of the calculus of variations rather
than as an ordinary application of Fermat’s method of
maxima and minima (Pedersen [53]),
and speculate that Fermat thus anticipated Jacob Bernoulli who is gen-
erally credited with inventing the method of the calculus of variations
in 1696. Arguably, at least some of the manifestations of the method
of adequality amount to variational techniques exploiting a small or
infinitesimal variation e.
10. Conclusion
Should Fermat’s e be interpreted as a formal variable, or should it
be interpreted as a member of an Archimedean continuum “tending”
to zero? Or perhaps should adequality be interpreted in terms of a
Bernoullian continuum,33 with e infinitesimal? Note that the term
“infinitesimal” was not introduced until around 1670,34 so Fermat could
not have used it. Yet infinitely small quantities were in routine use at
the time, by scholars like John Wallis who was in close contact with
Fermat.
While discussions of “process” are rare in Fermat when he deals with
his e, we mentioned an instance of such use in Subsection 1.4.35 Writes
Strømholm:
It will not do here to drag forth the time-honoured “lim-
iting process” of historians of mathematics [. . . ] Fermat
was still thinking in terms of equations; I agree that he
stood on the verge of a period where mathematicians
came to accept that sort of process, but he himself was
in this particular case rather the last of the ancients
than the first of the moderns (Strømholm [65, p. 67]).
33G. Schubring attributes the first systematic use of infinitesimals as a founda-
tional concept, to Johann Bernoulli, see [60, p. 170, 173, 187]. To note the fact of
such systematic use by Bernoulli is not to say that Bernoulli’s foundation is ade-
quate, or that that it could distinguish between manipulations with infinitesimals
that produce only true results and those manipulations that can yield false results.
One such infinitesimal distinction was provided by Cauchy [16] in 1853, thereby
resolving an ambiguity inherent in his 1821 “sum theorem” (see Katz & Katz [33]
for details).
34Some contemporary scholars hold that Leibniz coined the term infinitesimal
in 1673 (see Probst [55] and [51]). Meanwhile, Leibniz himself attributed the term
to Nicolaus Mercator (see Leibniz [41]).
35See quotation following footnote 9.
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In the absence of infinitesimals, there is no possibility of interpreting
smallness other than by means of a process of tending to zero. But, as
Strømholm confirms, such a discussion is uncharacteristic of Fermat,
even at the application stage, when he applies his method in concrete
instances. Therefore the infinitesimal interpretation (3) is more plau-
sible than the kinetic interpretation (2) (see Section 1).
To return to the question posed in Section 1, as to which of the three
approaches is closest to Fermat’s thinking, it could be that the answer
to the riddle is. . . it depends. When Fermat presents his definitional
characterisation of adequality, as on the first page of his Me´thode pour
la recherche du maximum et du minimum, his algorithmic presentation
has a strong formal/algebraic flavor. However, at the application stage,
both in geometry and physics, ideas of approximation or smallness
become indispensable.
Breger [14, 205-206] claims that adequality cannot be interpreted as
approximate equality. Breger’s argument is based on his contention
that the Latin term adaequare was not used in the sense of approxi-
mate equality by Fermat’s contemporaries. However, the source of ad-
equality is in the Greek παρισo´της (parisote¯s), rather than the Latin
adaequare, undermining Breger’s argument. The question that should
be asked is not whether Fermat’s contemporaries used the term adae-
quare, but rather whether they used the infinitely small. The latter
were certainly in routine use at the time, by some of the greatest of
Fermat’s contemporaries such as Kepler and Wallis.
In addition to the 3-way division: formal, kinetic, and infinitesimal,
there is a distinction between (A) Fermat’s definition, i.e., synopsis
of the method as it appears in Fermat [19, p. 121]; and (B) what he
actually does when he applies his method.
Fermat’s definition (A) does have the air of a kind of a formal alge-
braic manipulation. A formal interpretation of adequality is certainly
mathematically coherent, regardless of what Fermat meant by it, since
one can define differentiation even over a finite field . The fact itself
of being able to give a purely algebraic account of this mathematical
technique is not surprising. What is dubious is the claim that at the
application stage (B), he is similarly applying an algebraic procedure,
rather than thinking of e geometrically as vanishing, tending to zero,
infinitesimal, etc.
In light of the positivity of Fermat’s e in the calculation of the tan-
gent line, the formal story would have difficulty accounting for the
passage from inequality to adequality, since the inequality is satisfied
for transverse rays as well as the tangent ray. To make sense of what
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is going on at stage (B), we have to appeal to geometry, to negligible,
vanishing , or infinitesimal quantities, or their rate or order .
Breger’s insistence on the formal interpretation (1), when applied
to the application stage (B), is therefore not convincing. Fermat may
have presented a polished-up algebraic presentation of his method at
stage (A) that not even Descartes can find holes in, but he gave it away
at stage (B).
Kleiner and Movshovitz-Hadar note that
Fermat’s method was severely criticized by some of his
contemporaries. They objected to his introduction and
subsequent suppression of the mysterious e. Dividing
by emeant regarding it as not zero. Discarding e implied
treating it as zero. This is inadmissible, they rightly
claimed. In a somewhat different context, but with equal
justification, Bishop Berkeley in the 18th century would
refer to such e′s as ‘the ghosts of departed quantities’
[37, p. 970] [emphasis added–authors].
Kleiner and Movshovitz-Hadar feel that Fermat’s suppression of e im-
plies treating e as zero, and that the criticisms by his contemporaries
and by Berkeley were justified. However, P. Strømholm already pointed
out in 1968 that in Fermat’s main method of adequality (M1),
there was never [. . . ] any question of the variation E
being put equal to zero. The words Fermat used to
express the process of suppressing terms containing E
was “elido”, “deleo”, and “expungo”, and in French
“i’efface” and “i’oˆte”. We can hardly believe that a
sane man wishing to express his meaning and searching
for words, would constantly hit upon such tortuous ways
of imparting the simple fact that the terms vanished be-
cause E was zero (Strømholm [65, p. 51]).
Fermat did not have the notion of the derivative. Yet, by insisting
that e is being discarded rather than set equal to zero, he planted the
seeds of the solution of the paradox of the infinitesimal quotient and
its disappearing dx, a century before George Berkeley ever lifted up his
pen to write The Analyst .36
36The heuristic procedure of discarding the remaining terms was codified by
Leibniz by means of his Transcendental Law of Homogeneity (see Section 2.3).
Centuries later, it was implemented mathematically in terms of the standard part
function, which associates to each finite hyperreal number, the unique real number
infinitely close to it. In 1961, Robinson [56] constructed an infinitesimal-enriched
continuum, suitable for use in calculus, analysis, and elsewhere, based on earlier
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After summarizing Nieuwentijt’s position on infinitesimals, Leibniz
wrote in 1695:
It follows that since in the equations for investigating
tangents, maxima and minima (which the esteemed au-
thor [i.e., Nieuwentijt] attributes to Barrow, although if
I am not mistaken Fermat used them first) there remain
infinitely small quantities, their squares or rectangles are
eliminated (Leibniz 1695 [40, p. 321]).
Leibniz held that methods of investigating tangents, minima, and max-
ima involve infinitesimals. Furthermore, he disagreed with Nieuwentijt
as to the priority of developing these methods, specifically attribut-
ing them to Fermat. Thus, Leibniz appears to have felt that Fermat’s
methods of investigating tangents, minima and maxima did rely on
infinitesimals. In the absence of explicit commentary by Fermat con-
cerning the nature of E, Leibniz’s view may be the best 17th century
expert view on the matter.
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